This paper considers the estate division problem from a non-cooperative perspective. The integer claim game initiated by O'Neill (1982) and extended by Atlamaz et al. (2011) is generalized by considering different sharing rules to divide every interval among the claimants. For problems with an estate larger than half of the total entitlements, we show that every sharing rule satisfying four fairly general axioms yields the same set of Nash equilibrium profiles and corresponding payoffs. Every rule that always results in such equilibrium payoff vector is characterized by the properties minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half. Well-known examples are the Talmud rule, the adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule. Then our focus turns to more specific claim games, i.e. games that use the constrained equal awards rule, the Talmud rule, or the constrained equal losses rule as a sharing rule. Also a variation on the claim game is considered by allowing for arbitrary instead of integer claims.
Introduction
The estate division problem, also known as bankruptcy problem or rationing problem, concerns the issue of dividing an estate among a group of claimants who have entitlements to the estate, when the sum of these entitlements exceeds the size of the estate. A seminal paper on this problem is O'Neill (1982) . Subsequently, most research has focused on comparing different solution rules by their properties. For an overview of this normative, axiomatic approach, see Thomson (2003) .
The estate division problem can also be approached strategically, i.e., by a non-cooperative game. O'Neill (1982) already formulates a non-cooperative game, associated with an estate division problem, in which players can use their entitlements to claim specific parts of the estate. More precisely, think of an estate with size E as an interval [0, E] . Each player can partition this interval into finitely many subintervals and on each of those subintervals put a claim such that the total amount claimed is equal to his entitlement. Then every subinterval is equally divided among those players claiming the subinterval. O'Neill (1982) considers the Nash equilibria of this game. Atlamaz et al. (2011) extend this game by allowing for multiple claims on every subinterval and dividing every subinterval according to the proportional rule with respect to the claims. We generalize their game by allowing for other possible sharing rules to divide the subintervals.
In by far the larger part of the paper we focus on restricted estate division problems, which means that individual entitlements do not exceed the size of the estate. For the case in which claims are integer-valued, our first result is of an axiomatic nature and applies to problems for which the estate is larger than half of the total entitlements. Under four fairly general axioms: efficiency, claims boundedness, equal treatment of two claims and responsiveness; the set of equilibrium profiles and corresponding payoffs is characterized. We show that a rule always results in an equilibrium payoff vector if and only if the rule satisfies the properties minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half. Three well-known rules that satisfy both properties are the Talmud rule, the adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule. This result provides a non-cooperative support to use either of these rules for these kind of problems.
We then direct our attention to claim games that use the constrained equal awards rule, the Talmud rule, or the constrained equal losses rule as a sharing rule. Actually, we consider sharing rules derived from a particular family of rules, the TAL-family, which has been introduced by Moreno- Ternero and Villar (2006) and includes the above three rules. For a characterization result for this family as a whole, we refer to Moreno-Ternero (2011) . We characterize all Nash equilibria of the associated claim games and the corresponding payoffs. These results indicate that there is not one general characterization for claims problems with an estate smaller than half of the total entitlements -in contrast to problems with an estate larger than half of the total entitlements.
We also investigate what happens if we relax the assumption of placing integer-valued claims and allow for arbitrary claim heights. Unlike for the proportional case (Atlamaz et al., 2011) , the claims profile in which every player has a uniform claim over the estate, is usually not the unique equilibrium claims profile.
Although we use the estate division terminology, our model has applications other than the division of a heritage or the leftovers of a bankrupt firm. For instance, think of the interval [0, E] as representing a continuum of uniformly distributed consumers (cf. Hotelling, 1929) , and of the claimants as firms who provide services to the consumers, with total services equal to the entitlements. Every claim can be thought of as an investment in a particular consumer segment. Since we allow for multiple claims, this interpretation allows for competitive investments by different firms in the same consumer segment. As we can choose the sharing rule, it is possible to allow for different forms of competition among the firms. Aside from proportional division of the consumers, one could think of a form of competition in which the firms that invest maximally in a given segment, equally share the consumers in that segment -this is achieved by using the constrained equal losses rule in our model. Or one could imagine a competition in which all investing firms equally share a segment -achieved by using the constrained equal awards rule.
In other related applications the shares induced by the claims may be interpreted as probabilities of winning in, for instance, political elections (cf. Merolla et al., 2005) or auctions (cf. Cramton et al., 2003) . Note also the connection to Colonel Blotto games (Borel, 1921) .
It is also possible (but postponed to future work) to extend to non-homogeneous preferences over the estate, like in Pálvölgyi et al. (2013) . This extension has several additional applications like, for example, land division problems (Berliant et al., 1992) .
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain the basic model and introduce the relevant sharing rules. In Section 3, we analyze integer claim games for restricted problems with an estate larger than half of the total entitlements. Section 4 also considers integer claim games, but now for more particular sharing rules. In Section 5, players are allowed to place arbitrary claims. Section 6 analyzes the relation between restricted and unrestricted problems. In Section 7 we conclude.
The model
The set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2. An estate division problem is a pair (E, c) , where E ∈ R, E > 0, is the estate and c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ R N with c i > 0 for all i ∈ N and i∈N c i ≥ E, is the vector of entitlements. Let C N be the class of all problems and let C N 0 be the class of all problems with i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. A payoff vector for (E, c) ∈ C N is a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R N + with i∈N x i ≤ E, where x i is the payoff to player i, and R + := [0, ∞).
The purpose of this paper is to find payoff vectors for estate division problems as equilibrium outcomes of a suitable non-cooperative game. To this end, we first define a sharing rule to be a function f that assigns to every b ∈ R N + a vector f (b) ∈ [0, 1] N such that i∈N f i (b) ≤ 1. Given a sharing rule f we associate with an estate division problem (E, c) ∈ C N a claim game, denoted by (E, c, f ). First, a strategy of player i ∈ N in this claim game consist of a finite division of the interval [0, E] into subintervals and on each subinterval a non-negative number of claims, such that the total amount claimed is equal to c i . It will be without loss of generality to assume that the strategies of all players have the same division of [0, E] in common, since otherwise we can consider the common refinement of the player divisions instead. The following definition therefore introduces so-called claims profiles, after which we can complete the definition of the game (E, c, f ).
We refer to the interval (y t−1 , y t ) as interval t. We write β(t) = (β i (t)) i∈N , where β i (t) is interpreted as the amount that player i claims on interval t; and we write M = {1, . . . , m}. We now use the sharing rule f to distribute every interval t among the claimants of the interval. Specifically, f i (β(t)) is the share of player i of interval t, and player i's payoff is determined by the payoff function
for every claims profile (y, β, m) . We write u f = (u f 1 , . . . , u f n ). This concludes the definition of the game (E, c, f ). Atlamaz et al. (2011) analyze this game with the proportional rule as the sharing rule. We generalize their results by considering different sharing rules. We first introduce four properties that a sharing rule may have.
The first requirement states that the interval is distributed if the total claim on it is at least 1.
The second requirement is that each player receives at most his claim.
The next property says that two players obtain equal shares if they have a claim of 1 and are the only two claimants.
Equal treatment of two claims. For each
The last property states that for any number of claims of the other players, there is an amount of claims such that the own share is positive.
Let us now define some particular sharing rules derived from the TAL-family, to which the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule and the Talmud rule belong. For the original definitions of these rules see Remark 2.7.
We first describe the constrained equal awards rule f CEA (as a sharing rule).
Definition 2.2. For each b ∈ R N + and each i ∈ N ,
where λ is the unique solution of the equation j∈N min{b j , λ} = 1.
The constrained equal awards rule assigns equal shares to all claimants subject to no one receiving more than his claim. Note that f CEA (0, . . . , 0) = (0, . . . , 0). When used in a claim game this implies that if a part (an interval) of the estate is not claimed, then it is not distributed. We write u CEA instead of u f CEA .
The constrained equal losses rule f CEL (as a sharing rule) is defined as follows.
where µ is the unique solution of the equation j∈N max{0, b j − µ} = 1.
1 Define b −i as the vector (bj) j =i and b as the vector (b −i , bi).
The constrained equal losses rule focuses on the loss each claimant incurs. The rule divides these losses equally among all claimants subject to no one receiving a negative amount. Again, in the claim game, if a part of the estate is not claimed, then it is not distributed. We write u CEL instead of u f CEL .
The sharing rules derived from the TAL-family f θ , identified by a single parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], are defined as follows.
where µ is the unique solution of the equation j∈N max{θb j , b j − µ} = 1 and λ is the unique solution of the equation j∈N min{θb j , λ} = 1.
Every rule from the TAL-family combines the principles of the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. Namely, if θ times the aggregate claim is at least one, then no one receives more than a fraction of θ of his claim. In this case, the constrained equal awards rule is applied with θb as claims. If θ times the aggregate claim is smaller than one, everyone receives at least a θ-fraction of his claim and the remainder is divided using the constrained equal losses rule with (1 − θ)b as claims. This family of rules generalizes the Talmud rule, for which this switch happens exactly halfway, so for θ = 1 2 . For every θ ∈ [0, 1], we write u θ instead of u f θ . Note that f 1 = f CEA and f 0 = f CEL . We refer to f 1 2 as the Talmud sharing rule, and denote the corresponding payoff function by u T .
Remark. All sharing rules derived from the TAL-family satisfy efficiency, claims boundedness, equal treatment of two claims and responsiveness.
For completeness, we define the proportional rule f P (as a sharing rule), used in Atlamaz et al. (2011) .
Definition 2.5. For each b ∈ R N + and each i ∈ N ,
We denote the corresponding vector of payoff functions by u P .
Remark. The proportional sharing rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment of two claims and responsiveness. In general, this rule need not satisfy claims boundedness. However, if we assume integer-valued claims then this condition is satisfied.
Our purpose is to analyze Nash equilibrium outcomes of the claim game under different sharing rules. The following definition is standard.
Definition 2.6. A claims profile (y, β, m) is a Nash equilibrium profile (NEP) in (E, c, u f ) if each player maximizes his own payoff, given his opponents' claims.
Hence, in an NEP, no player can increase his payoff by unilaterally reshuffling his claims. Let the marginal gain or loss be defined as the gain or loss per unit interval from increasing or decreasing one's claim on that interval with a smallest claim unit, which is 1 in the case that only integer claims are allowed, and infinitesimal otherwise. Then, in an NEP, the marginal loss of decreasing one's claim on some interval should be at least as large as the marginal gain of increasing one's claim on some other interval. For proportional sharing this condition is also sufficient for a claim profile to be an NEP (Atlamaz et al., 2011) , but this does not hold in general. Suppose, as an example, that claims are restricted to be integer-valued -a case that we will study extensively in Section 3 -and that the constrained equal losses rule is used as the sharing rule; and suppose that β i (t) = 2 for some player i and interval t, whereas β j (t) = 0 for all j = i. If player j = i places a claim of size 1 on t his gain on t is zero, hence his marginal gain is zero. If, however, j places a claim of size 2 on t his gain on t is 1 2 and, thus, his average gain is 1 4 . Marginal and average gains and losses for claim games with integer claims are defined formally in Section 3, where we present a characterization of NEPs in terms of average gains and losses.
We are interested in the payoffs associated with NEPs with respect to different sharing rules. For every claim game (E, c, f ) we denote the set of equilibrium payoffs by
Once the set of equilibrium payoffs for the particular claim games is characterized, our aim is to find rules yielding a payoff within this set of equilibrium payoffs. Formally, a rule is a function R that associates with every (E,
Remark 2.7. The original constrained equal awards rule assigns to player i in an estate division problem (E, c) the amount min{c i , λ}, where λ solves j∈N min{c j , λ} = E. Recall that, by assumption, j∈N c j ≥ E. The original constrained equal losses rule assigns to player i the amount max{0, c i − µ}, where µ solves j∈N max{0, c j − µ} = E. The original TAL-rule with parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] assigns to player i the amount max{θc i , c i − µ} if θ j∈N c j < E, and min{θc i , λ} if θ j∈N c j ≥ E, where µ and λ are the unique solutions of the equations j∈N max{θc j , c j −µ} = E and j∈N min{θc j , λ} = E, respectively. The original proportional rule assigns to player i the amount c i j∈N c j E. The payoffs assigned by the original rules in Remark 2.7 are also obtained by applying the associated sharing rules to the claims profile in which each player puts a constant claim c i E on the entire estate. 2 We call this claims profile, the profile (y, β, 1), the uniform claims profile.
Example 2.8. Consider the estate division problem (E, c) with E = 4 and c = (4, 2, 1). The payoffs assigned to the players by the (original) constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule and the Talmud rule are found by considering the uniform claims profile, that is, β(1) = 1, 1 2 , 1 4 . Figure 1 illustrates the three sharing rules. The associated shares are f CEA (β(1)) = 3 8 , 3 8 , 1 4 , f CEL (β(1)) = 3 4 , 1 4 , 0 and f T (β(1)) = 5 8 , 1 4 , 1 8 . The corresponding payoffs are u CEA = 1 1 2 , 1 1 2 , 1 , u CEL = (3, 1, 0) and u T = 2 1 2 , 1, 1 2 . A restricted problem is an estate division problem (E, c) with c i ≤ E for all i ∈ N . O'Neill (1982) considers claim games with the proportional sharing rule for restricted problems, in which β i (t) ∈ {0, 1} for each claims profile (y, β, m), each i ∈ N , and each t ∈ M . We generalize to multiple and not per se integer claims and different sharing rules. We start with restricted problems and multiple integer claims in the next section.
Restricted problems and integer claims
In this section we consider restricted problems (E, c) ∈ C N , i.e., c i ≤ E for all i ∈ N , and integer claims in each associated claim game, i.e., β i : M → {0} ∪ N for every claims profile (y, β, m) and every i ∈ N . This is the setting also considered in O'Neill (1982) , with the difference that β i (t) > 1 is allowed.
Let f be a sharing rule satisfying the minimal requirements efficiency and claims boundedness. We will first define Nash equilibrium profiles (Definition 2.6) in terms of average gains and losses. Let (y, β, m) be a claims profile. For i ∈ N and t ∈ M with i ∈ P (t), and ∆ ∈ N with 1 ≤ ∆ ≤ β i (t), define
where (y, β , m) is a claims profile in the problem (E, c ) such that β is equal to β except that
where (y, β , m) is a claims profile in the problem (E, c ) such that β is equal to β except that β i (t) = β i (t) + ∆, and c is equal to c except that c i = c i + (y t − y t−1 )∆. Hence, AL i (∆, t) is the average loss (in share) to player i ∈ N of decreasing his claim on interval t ∈ M by an amount ∆, and AG i (∆, t) is the average gain (in share) of increasing his claim on t ∈ M by an amount ∆, both measured per unit interval. For ∆ = 1 these entities are called marginal loss and marginal gain.
The following lemma characterizes Nash equilibrium profiles: a claims profile is an NEP if and only if every interval is positively claimed and for every player the minimum average loss from decreasing his claim on some interval is at least as large as the maximum average gain from increasing his claim on some other interval. 
(1)
Proof. For the only-if part, let claims profile (y, β, m) be an NEP. We first show |P (t)| ≥ 1 for all t ∈ M . Suppose, contrary to what we want to show, there exists t ∈ M with |P (t)| = 0. Since
We consider two cases: |P (t )| = 1 and |P (t )| ≥ 2.
If |P (t )| = 1, then whenever player i ∈ P (t ) reduces his claim on t by one, he remains the only claimant and thus by efficiency and claims boundedness f i (β(t)) = 1. If player i places this free claim on t, then he is the only claimant and gains a positive amount. 3 This is in contradiction with the NEP assumption.
If |P (t )| ≥ 2, then because a sharing rule distributes at most a total share of one, there is a player i ∈ P (t ) with f i (β(t )) < 1. So AL i (1, t ) < 1. However, by efficiency and claims boundedness AG i (1, t) = 1. Hence player i gains a positive amount by reshuffling a claim from t to t, which contradicts the NEP assumption.
Next suppose, contrary to (1), there is a player i for which there exist t, t ∈ M with i ∈ P (t), ∆ 1 ∈ {1, . . . , β i (t)} and ∆ 2 ∈ N, such that AL i (∆ 1 , t) < AG i (∆ 2 , t ). Taking away ∆ 1 from (a part of) interval t and placing ∆ 2 on (a sufficiently small part of) interval t implies an improvement for player i, which contradicts that (y, β, m) is an NEP.
For the if-part, assume that |P (t)| ≥ 1 for all t ∈ M and (1) is satisfied for all i ∈ N . We show that (y, β, m) is an NEP.
Consider a claim vectorβ i = β i for player i ∈ N (potentially resulting in a different partition of [0, E], but in that case we consider the common refinement of both partitions). We argue that the payoff from claim vector β i is at least as large as the payoff fromβ i . The difference in payoff between the two claims profiles arises from intervals on which the claims of player i differ. Let
respectively denote the intervals with lower and higher claims when going from β i toβ i . Note that the total difference in claim on intervals from M l is equal to the total difference in claim on intervals M h , because player i must use his full entitlement. Moreover, the average loss from intervals from M l is at least as high as the average gain from intervals from M h , due to (1). Hence the claim vector β i is a best response, as it results in a payoff at least as high as the payoff from all other claim vectors.
In the rest of the paper we will often use (sometimes without explicit mentioning) Lemma 3.1 instead of Definition 2.6 when determining Nash equilibria of claim games.
Axiomatic approach
In this subsection, we consider restricted problems (E, c) ∈ C N 0 , i.e. i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. For this subset of problems, we provide a characterization of all Nash equilibrium profiles if the sharing rule satisfies efficiency, claims boundedness, equal treatment of two claims and responsiveness. 4
Theorem 3.2. Let f satisfy efficiency, claims boundedness, equal treatment of two claims and responsiveness and let (y, β, m) be a claims profile for the restricted problem (E, c) ∈ C N 0 . Equivalent are:
Note that responsiveness implies that for all t ∈ M and all i ∈ P (t), f i (β(t)) > 0. Suppose this claim would not be true, then a player i ∈ P (t) with f i (β(t)) = 0 can improve his payoff. Specifically, player i can reduce his claim on t without any loss. Since f is responsive, there is some β i (t) ∈ N such that f i ((β −i (t), β i (t ))) > 0. So by placing β i (t) claims on a sufficiently small subinterval of t, player i increases his payoff.
First we show that for all t ∈ M , if |P (t)| = 1, then β i (t) = 1 for i ∈ P (t). Suppose, to the contrary, |P (t)| = 1 and β i (t) > 1 for i ∈ P (t). Since player i is the only claimant on t, by efficiency and claims boundedness he can reduce his claim on t without any loss. Since we consider restricted problems, there is t ∈ M with β i (t ) = 0. Since f satisfies responsiveness, there is some β i (t ) ∈ N such that f i ((β −i (t), β i (t ))) > 0. So by placing β i (t ) claims on a sufficiently small subinterval of t , player i could improve his payoff. This is in contradiction with the assumption that (y, β, m) is an NEP.
Second we show that for all t ∈ M , if |P (t)| = 2, then β i (t) = 1 for each i ∈ P (t). We distinguish two different cases and use a proof by contradiction for each of these cases.
Suppose β i (t) ≥ β j (t) ≥ 2 for i, j ∈ P (t) and i = j. Then since f i (β(t)) > 0 and f j (β(t)) > 0, by definition of a sharing rule f i (β(t)) < 1 and f j (β(t)) < 1. As both players claim t at least twice,
Hence for at least one of these two players (a player without a claim on t ), say player i, AG i (1, t ) = 1 2 by efficiency, claims 4 Responsiveness requires that for all i ∈ N and for all b −i ∈ R N \{i} + , there is some bi ∈ R+ such that fi(b) > 0. Since we consider integer-valued claims, we implicitly assume bi ∈ N.
boundedness and equal treatment of two claims. This contradicts Lemma 3.1.
Suppose β i (t) > β j (t) = 1 for i, j ∈ P (t). We consider two different possible subcases.
Hence for at least one of these two players (a player without a claim on t ), say player i, AG i (1, t ) = 1 2 by efficiency, claims boundedness and equal treatment of two claims. This contradicts Lemma 3.1.
If 0 < f i (β(t)) ≤ 1 2 ≤ f j (β(t)) < 1, then player i could reduce his claim on t to β j (t) such that his share of t equals 1 2 (by efficiency, claims boundedness and equal treatment of two claims). Either this is an improvement or else he could use his free claim to gain a positive amount of some interval t for which β i (t ) = 0. Since we consider a restricted problem such an interval exists and by responsiveness such a deviation exists.
Finally, we establish a contradiction for any
This implies that there are at least two players i ∈ P (t) with f i (β(t)) < 1 2 . But then for these two players,
Hence for at least one of these two players (a player without a claim on t ), AG i (1, t ) = 1 2 by efficiency, claims boundedness and equal treatment of two claims. This contradicts Lemma 3.1.
If |P (t)| = 1, then player i ∈ P (t) with f i (β(t)) = 1 is never able to gain by changing his claim on t.
If |P (t)| = 2, then AL i (1, t) = 1 2 for i ∈ P (t). Since for all t ∈ M ,
can be obtained if |P (t )| = 1 and i / ∈ P (t ) or if |P (t )| = 2 and i ∈ P (t )) and AG i (∆, t ) ≤ 1 2 for ∆ ≥ 2 (since a sharing rule distributes at most 1), condition (1) of Lemma 3.1 is satisfied. Hence the claims profile constitutes an NEP.
The next result describes every payoff vector in the set of equilibrium payoff vectors obtained in Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.3. Let f satisfy efficiency, claims boundedness, equal treatment of two claims and responsiveness and let (E, c) ∈ C N 0 be a restricted problem. The following two statements are equivalent:
Proof. Suppose (y, β, m) is an NEP in (E, c, f CEL ). In view of Theorem 3.2, the length of the part that is claimed by two different players is equal to i∈N c i − E and the length of the part with total claim 1 is equal to 2E − i∈N c i . To find the payoff of each player, let r i denote the part of player i's claim invested in intervals with total claim 2. Then, c i − r i is put on intervals with total claim 1.
The corresponding payoff for each player i in such a claims profile is equal to
Conversely, suppose there exists a vector r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) satisfying the above conditions. Each such vector r gives rise to an NEP: distribute parts of the entitlement with sizes r i on the interval [0, i∈N c i − E], such that two players each have a claim of 1 on each part; and distribute the remaining parts of the entitlements c i − r i on the interval [ i∈N c i − E, E], such that each part has total claim 1. To see that this distribution is feasible, note that since i∈N (
Hence we found a feasible claims profile that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.2, that is, we have an NEP.
Remark 3.4. If there are two players (n = 2) then it is easy to see that in an NEP the claims should have minimal overlap. So the only choice for (r 1 , r 2 ) is r 1 = r 2 = c 1 + c 2 − E, resulting in the unique equilibrium payoffs E+c 1 −c 2 2 , E+c 2 −c 1 2 . These payoffs coincide with the payoffs assigned by concede-and-divide (Thomson, 2003) .
The following example presents an estate division problem for which many well-known rules do not result in an equilibrium payoff vector. 5 (Atlamaz et al., 2011, give a different example to show that the proportional rule need not be obtained in equilibrium.)
Example 3.5. Consider the restricted problem (E, c) ∈ C N 0 with E = 4 and c = (4, 2, 1), cf. Example 2.8. For this problem, r 1 = 3, r 2 = 2 and r 3 = 1 (see Figure 2 ). Hence there is a unique equilibrium payoff vector equal to 2 1 2 , 1, 1 2 . Every rule from the TAL-family with parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] assigns a payoff θ to player 3. For example, the constrained equal awards rule assigns the payoff vector 1 1 2 , 1 1 2 , 1 , the Talmud rule assigns the payoff vector 2 1 2 , 1, 1 2 and the constrained equal losses rule assigns the payoff vector (3, 1, 0).
The payoff vector of the proportional rule is equal to 2 2 7 , 1 1 7 , 4 7 , the payoff vector of the adjusted proportional rule is equal to 2 1 2 , 1, 1 2 , the payoff vector of the random arrival rule is equal to 2 1 2 , 1, 1 2 , the payoff vector of the reversed Talmud rule is equal to 2 1 6 , 1 1 6 , 2 3 , the payoff vector of the Piniles rule is equal to 2 1 6 , 1 1 6 , 2 3 , the payoff vector of the constrained egalitarian rule is equal to (2, 1, 1), and the payoff vector of the minimal overlap rule is equal to 2 5 6 , 5 6 , 1 3 . Hence the only rules resulting in an equilibrium payoff are the Talmud rule, the adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule.
Figure 2: An illustration of a Nash equilibrium claims profile (y, β, m) for problem (E, c) with E = 4 and c = (4, 2, 1). Each square corresponds to a claim: the number in the square is the name of the player who puts that claim on the interval. Here r 1 = 3, r 2 = 2 and r 1 = 1.
The above example illustrates that not all rules are supported by an equilibrium argument. In the remainder of this section, we prove that each rule that always leads to an equilibrium vector in claim games with i∈N c i /2 ≤ E must satisfy minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half.
In order to define these properties, we need an additional piece of notation.
The first requirement states that the payoff vector is equivalently obtainable (i) directly and (ii) by first assigning the minimal right to each player, adjusting the claims downwards by these amounts and applying the rule to divide the remainder (Curiel et al., 1987) .
The following property says that each player receives at half his claim.
Lower bound of degree half. For each (E, c) ∈ C N 0 , R(E, c) ≥ min{c/2, E/2}.
It turns out that above two properties describe the equilibrium behavior of a rule.
Theorem 3.6. Let f satisfy efficiency, claims boundedness, equal treatment of two claims and responsiveness. Equivalent are:
(ii) R satisfies minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half.
Proof. We first prove the implication (i) ⇒ (ii). Let (E, c) ∈ C N 0 be a restricted problem. By assumption, R(E, c) ∈ U (E, c, f ). By Corollary 3.3, there exists a vector r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) such
Recall that r i for i ∈ N specifies the amount of claim placed on an interval with total claims 2.
We first show that R satisfies minimal rights.
is placed on an interval with total claim 1 and the minimal right is assigned to player i. Now we show that the revised problem E − i∈N m i (E, c), c − m(E, c) is a restricted problem in C N 0 such that r satisfies the conditions of Corollary 3.3 for this problem. To this end, we first prove two claims.
Several cases are to be considered.
If K = ∅, then the claim states 0 ≤ 2E − i∈N c i which is true by assumption.
which is true as j∈N \K c j ≥ 0 and i∈N c i ≥ E. Hence the Claim is proved.
Note the following properties of r:
Hence the conditions of Corollary 3.3 are satisfied for the revised problem, which proves that
Hence, R satisfies lower bound of degree half.
We now prove the converse implication (ii) ⇒ (i). Let R satisfy minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half and let (E, c) ∈ C N 0 be a restricted problem. Define r i = 2 · (c i − R i (E, c)) for all i ∈ N . We show that r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) satisfies the conditions of Corollary 3.3. Note the following properties of r: (iii) for all i ∈ N ,
where the second equality follows from minimal rights first and the inequality from lower bound of degree half for the revised problem (remember the revised problem is a restricted problem in C N 0 ).
There are three well-known rules that satisfy these two properties: the Talmud rule, the adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule. The above result provides a non-cooperative support for these three rules.
Example 3.7. Consider the restricted problem (E, c) ∈ C N 0 with E = 4 and c = (3, 2, 1). For this problem, the Talmud rule assigns the payoff vector 2 1 4 , 1 1 4 , 1 2 , the adjusted proportional rule assigns the payoff vector 2 1 5 , 1 1 5 , 3 5 and the random arrival rule assigns the payoff vector 2 1 6 , 1 1 6 , 4 6 . Hence the three rules can assign a different payoff vector.
Recall that the Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) is the TAL-rule with parameter 1 2 . Proposition 3.8. The Talmud rule satisfies minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half.
Proof. In Curiel et al. (1987) it is already mentioned that the Talmud rule satisfies minimal rights first. Let i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. By definition of the Talmud rule, lower bound of degree half is satisfied.
Next, we consider the adjusted proportional rule (Curiel et al., 1987) . Let t i (E, c) = min{c i , E} be the truncation of player i and t(E, c) = (t i (E, c) ) i∈N . The adjusted proportional rule first assigns minimal rights to each player. Second, each claim is revised downwards to the minimum of the remainder and the difference between the initial claim and the minimal right. Third, the remainder is divided proportionally to the revised claims.
Definition 3.9. For each (E, c) ∈ C N and each i ∈ N ,
Proposition 3.10. The adjusted proportional rule satisfies minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half.
Proof. Curiel et al. (1987) show that the adjusted proportional rule satisfies minimal rights first. We show that the rule satisfies lower bound of degree half for problems with i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. c) ) . In the proof of Theorem 3.6, it is shown that the revised problem E − i∈N m i (E, c), c − m(E, c) is a restricted problem. Hence the adjusted proportional rule assigns to each player i ∈ N ,
where the first inequality follows from the second claim in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Finally, we consider the random arrival rule (O'Neill, 1982) . To define the random arrival rule, imagine players arriving one at a time, and compensate them fully until money runs out. The resulting payoff vector of course depends on the order in which claimants arrive. To remove the unfairness associated with a particular order, take the arithmetic average over all orders of arrival of the payoff vectors calculated in this way. Formally, let Π N be the class of bijections from N into itself.
Definition 3.11. For each (E, c) ∈ C N and each i ∈ N ,
Proposition 3.12. The random arrival rule satisfies minimal rights first and lower bound of degree half.
Proof. In Curiel et al. (1987) it is already mentioned that the random arrival rule satisfies minimal rights first. We show that the random arrival rule satisfies lower bound of degree half for problems with i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. Let i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. Let π ∈ Π N and let π be the permutation in which the order of π is reversed. Take i ∈ N , then it is sufficient to show that the average payoff for player i is at least 1 2 c i .
Define S = {j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)} and S = {j ∈ N | π (j) < π (i)}. Note that S ∪ S ∪ {i} = N and S ∩ S = ∅. We distinguish three cases.
If S = ∅ or if |S| ≥ 1 and i∈S c i ≤ E − c i , then player i is fully compensated in π. Hence the average payoff of player i over π and π is at least 1 2 c i . If |S| ≥ 1 and E − c i < i∈S c i < E, then player i gets a compensation of E − i∈S c i in π.
Since i∈N c i ≤ 2E, i∈S c i < E. So player i gets a compensation of min{c i , E − i∈S c i } in π . Since 2E − j =i c j ≥ c i , player i's average payoff over π and π is at least 1 2 c i .
If |S| ≥ 1 and i∈S c i ≥ E, then player i gets a compensation of 0 in π. Since i∈N c i ≤ 2E, i∈S c i ≤ E − c i . So player i is fully compensated in π . Hence the average payoff of player i over π and π is 1 2 c i . Since π and π are chosen arbitrarily and the random arrival rule takes the arithmetic average over all orders of arrival, this completes the proof.
Sharing rules derived from the TAL-family
We still consider restricted problems with multiple integer claims. The aim of this section is to study claim games with specific sharing rules. In particular, we restrict out attention to sharing rules derived from the TAL-family.
The following lemma is useful for computing average gains and losses if we use a sharing rule derived from the TAL-family. 
and
otherwise .
(3)
Proof. We first prove (2). For intervals t with θβ N (t) < 1, f θ i (β i (t)) = θβ i (t) if i / ∈ P max (t). So the marginal loss for player i ∈ P (t) equals θ if i / ∈ P max (t) and is strictly larger than θ if i ∈ P max (t). Thus, the marginal loss either decreases or remains constant as i decreases his claim on t. Hence in all such situations, the minimum average loss is obtained when i reduces his claim to zero, i.e., ∆ = β i (t).
On the other hand, if θβ N (t) ≥ 1 then the marginal loss for player i ∈ P (t) never decreases as i decreases his claim on t such that θβ N (t) ≥ 1. Moreover, the marginal loss is at most θ if θβ N (t) ≥ 1 and at least θ if θβ N (t) < 1. These two observations combined imply that the minimum average loss on those intervals is equal to the marginal loss for player i, i.e., ∆ = 1.
We next prove (3). If θβ N (t) < 1 and i / ∈ P max (t) then the maximum average gain on the interval is either the marginal gain (in case θ (β N (t) + β max (t) − β i (t)) ≥ 1), or the average gain of increasing the claim to β max (t) (such that i shares the remainder of 1 − θ (β N (t) + β max (t) − β i (t)) with the other players j ∈ P max (t)), or the average gain of increasing his claim to β max (t) + 1 (such that i is the only player with the largest claim and thus has no incentive to increase his claim any further).
In all other situations, where either i ∈ P max (t) (no incentive to add more than 1 to his claim) or θβ N (t) ≥ 1 (marginal gain can only decrease if i increases his claim), the maximum average gain is equal to the marginal gain of player i.
Remember every rule in the TAL-family is identified by a single parameter θ. In the ensuing subsections we consider the sharing rules f θ for θ ∈ [ 1 2 , 1] (among which the Talmud and constrained equal awards rule), θ = 0 (constrained equal losses rule), and θ ∈ (0, 1 2 ).
Constrained equal awards and Talmud
Let θ ∈ [ 1 2 , 1]. In this subsection we analyze the game (E, c, f θ ). Recall that among these sharing rules, we have the Talmud sharing rule and the constrained equal awards sharing rule.
Let (y, β, m) be a claims profile. Note that if |P (t)| = 1, then f θ i (β(t)) = 1 for i ∈ P (t). And if |P (t)| ≥ 2 for t ∈ M , then the constrained equal awards rule with θβ(t) as entitlements is used to determine the shares. As θ ≥ 1 2 , this implies that the interval is equally divided among the claimants. Thus, for each i ∈ N and each t ∈ M :
otherwise.
In words, each positively claimed interval is equally divided among those who put a positive claim on it. Therefore, the following lemma, which states that in an NEP each interval is claimed at most once by a player, does not come as a surprise. Proof. Let (y, β, m) be an NEP. Suppose, contrary to what we wish to prove, that β i (t) > 1 for some i ∈ N and some t ∈ M . Since c i ≤ E, there exists an interval t ∈ M with β i (t ) = 0. Since AL i (1, t) = 0 and AG i (1, t ) > 0, we obtain a contradiction with Lemma 3.1.
Since on each interval t each player has a claim of at most 1 in equilibrium, we end up in the same situation as considered by O'Neill (1982) . We obtain the following theorem. Proof. Suppose (y, β, m) is an NEP in (E, c, f θ ). Since i∈N c i ≥ E, every part is claimed positively by at least one player. Lemma 4.2 implies that every player puts at most claim 1 on each interval. Consider interval t with the minimum number of claimants and let k = |P (t)|. It is sufficient to show that each interval has either k or k+1 claimants. Suppose, contrary to what we wish to prove, that there exists an interval t ∈ M on which the total claim is at least k + 2. If player i with β i (t ) = 1 claims (a part of) t instead of t , his net gain will be at least 1 k+1 − 1 k+2 = 1 (k+1)(k+2) > 0, which is a contradiction.
For the converse implication, suppose there exists a k ∈ N such that for all t ∈ M , |P (t)| ∈ {k, k + 1} and β i (t) ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ N . Then for all t ∈ M , AL i (1, t) ≥ 1 k+1 for i ∈ P (t), and either AG i (1, t) ≤ 1 k+1 for i / ∈ P (t) or AG i (1, t) = 0 if i ∈ P (t). Hence (1) in Lemma 3.1 is satisfied: this claims profile is an NEP.
We refer to the set of equilibrium payoffs in Theorem 4.3 as U (E, c, f CEA ). So U (E, c, f CEA ) = U (E, c, f θ ) for all θ ∈ [ 1 2 , 1]. The result that the total claim on each interval is either k or k + 1, is similar to the result found by Atlamaz et al. (2011) for the proportional case. In that case, however, it is possible that a player puts two claims on the same interval, which does not happen in the above equilibria. Hence, the set of NEPs for the constrained equal awards rule is a subset of the set of NEPs for the proportional rule. Moreover, if β i (t) ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ N , then the same payoffs are generated. Thus, we have the following result.
Corollary 4.4. Let (E, c) ∈ C N be a restricted problem. Then
In order to describe the associated payoff vectors, recall that k = i∈N c i E . The length of the part with total claim k + 1 is equal to i∈N c i − kE and the length of the part that with total claim k is equal to (k + 1)E − i∈N c i . To find the payoff of each player, let r i denote the part of player i's claim invested in intervals with total claim k + 1. Then, c i − r i is put on intervals with total claim k. Clearly, 0 ≤ r i ≤ c i , r i ≤ i∈N c i − kE and the sum of all r i should equal (k + 1) · i∈N c i − kE . On the other hand, c i − r i ≤ (k + 1)E − i∈N c i . Summarizing, each NEP corresponds to a vector (r 1 , . . . , r n ) such that i∈N r i = (k + 1) · i∈N c i − kE and for
Conversely, each such vector gives rise to an NEP: distribute parts of the entitlement with sizes r i , i ∈ N , on the interval [0, i∈N c i − kE] such that each part is claimed by an amount of at most 1 and each part is claimed by exactly k + 1 players; and distribute the remaining parts of the entitlements c i − r i on the interval [ i∈N c i − kE, E] such that each part is claimed by an amount of at most 1 and each part is claimed by exactly k players. Although there are many NEPs associated with the same vector (r 1 , . . . , r n ), the corresponding payoff vector is the same for all of them, namely v = (v i ) i∈N , given by
for each i ∈ N . This implies that the set of payoff vectors attainable by NEPs is determined by linear inequalities and, in particular, is a polytope.
Example 4.5. Consider the restricted problem (E, c) with E = 4, n = 4, and c = (4, 3, 2, 1). For this problem, k = 2 and r 1 + r 2 + r 3 + r 4 = 6, where r 1 = 2, 1 ≤ r 2 ≤ 2, 1 ≤ r 3 ≤ 2 (since 0 ≤ r 3 < 1 contradicts with r 1 + r 2 + r 3 + r 4 = 6) and 0 ≤ r 4 ≤ 1. Hence, in an NEP in (E, c, f CEA ) player 1's payoff is 1 2 3 , player 2's payoff is in [1 1 6 , 1 1 3 ], player 3's payoff is in [ 2 3 , 5 6 ], and player 4's payoff is in [ 1 3 , 1 2 ]. An example of such a claims profile is represented in Figure 3 . The corresponding equilibrium payoffs are given by 1 2 3 , 1 1 6 , 5 6 , 1 3 . 1 2 3 0 2 3 3 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 Figure 3 : An illustration of a Nash equilibrium claims profile (y, β, m) for problem (E, c) with E = 4 and c = (4, 3, 2, 1). Here r 1 = 2, r 2 = 2, r 3 = 1 and r 4 = 1.
Constrained equal losses
In this subsection we analyze the game (E, c, f CEL ). For every t ∈ M we write P max (t) = {i ∈ N | β i (t) = β max (t)} for the set of players with maximal claim on t ∈ M . Since β i (t) ∈ N for every i ∈ P (t), only players i ∈ P max (t) obtain a positive share from interval t when the constrained equal losses sharing rule is applied. Observe the resemblance with a first-price auction in which the winners have equal probability to win the object. Formally, for every i ∈ N and t ∈ M :
For the next two lemmas, let claims profile (y, β, m) be an NEP of (E, c, f CEL ). The first lemma implies that every part is claimed by at most two different players.
Lemma 4.6. |P max (t)| ∈ {1, 2} for every t ∈ M .
Proof. Since β N (t) ≥ 1 for all t ∈ M , we suppose |P max (t)| ≥ 3 for t ∈ M and derive a contradiction. Consider a player i with β i (t) = β max (t). Then AL i (1, t) = 1 |Pmax(t)| and AG i (1, t) = 1 − 1 |Pmax(t)| . Since |P max (t)| ≥ 3, the marginal loss is smaller than the marginal gain, which contradicts Lemma 3.1.
The second lemma states that no player puts a claim higher than 1 on an interval. Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists an interval t ∈ M with β max (t) ≥ 2. By Lemma 4.6, |P max (t)| ∈ {1, 2}. We derive a contradiction for both cases.
Suppose |P max (t)| = 1 and consider player i ∈ P max (t) with β i (t) ≥ 2. If |P (t)| = 1, then player i can reduce his claim on t without loss and achieve a positive gain by placing this free claim sufficiently often on a part of the estate for which he is not yet the sole winner. If |P (t)| > 1, then player j ∈ P (t) \ P max (t) can reduce his claim on t without any loss and put β max (t) claims on a subinterval of t such that he gains a positive amount.
Suppose that |P max (t)| = 2 with β i (t) = β j (t) ≥ 2 for i, j ∈ P max (t) and i = j. Then for i ∈ P max (t), AL i (β i (t), t) = 1 2β i (t) and AG i (1, t) = 1 2 . Since β i (t) ≥ 2, we obtain a contradiction with Lemma 3.1.
Since β i (t) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and t ∈ M , the second statement of the lemma follows immediately.
The main result of this subsection is the following theorem, which presents a full characterization of the NEPs. Conversely, assume that |P (t)| ∈ {1, 2} and β i (t) ∈ {0, 1} for all for all t ∈ M and i ∈ N . If |P (t)| = 1, then player i ∈ P (t) with f i (β(t)) = 1 is never able to gain by changing his claim on t.
If |P (t)| = 2, then AL i (1, t) = 1 2 for i ∈ P (t). On the other hand, for all t ∈ M , AG i (1, t ) ≤ 1 2 (where 1 2 can be obtained if |P (t )| = 1 and i / ∈ P (t ) or if |P (t )| = 2 and i ∈ P (t )) and AG i (2, t ) = 1 2 for i / ∈ P (t ). Hence by Lemma 3.1, the claims profile constitutes an NEP.
Theorem 4.8 shows that the set of NEPs when using the constrained equal losses rule is a subset of the equilibria found for the constrained equal awards rule, which was again a subset of the equilibria found for the proportional rule. Moreover, since β i (t) ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ N , all three rules result in the same payoff vectors. We have the following result.
Corollary 4.9. Let (E, c) ∈ C N be a restricted problem. Then
Another consequence of the Theorem 4.8 is an existence condition for NEP. Proof. The only-if part follows from Theorem 4.8. For the if-part, note that if i∈N c i /2 ≤ E, we can iteratively, from left to right, put the claim of each player on a part of the estate which is not claimed yet and start over again on the left if the total claim on every part of the estate is 1. Since we consider restricted problems, we will end up with a claim profile satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.8.
Remaining sharing rules from the TAL-family
In this subsection we consider the game (E, c, f θ ) with θ ∈ (0, 1 2 ). If θ ∈ [ 1 3 , 1 2 ), then the induced sharing rule is different from the sharing rule with θ ∈ [ 1 2 , 1], but we do obtain the same set of NEPs. (We omit the formal proof, in which the main observation is that if |P (t)| = 2 for t ∈ M , then β i (t) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N and otherwise β i (t) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ M . This is mainly due to the constrained equal awards part of these rules.)
Lemma 4.11. Any rule in the TAL-family with θ ∈ [ 1 3 , 1] results in the same set of NEPs and in the same set of equilibrium payoffs in the game (E, c, f θ ), equal to U (E, c, f CEA ).
The only claim games that we have not discussed yet, are those associated with problems with i∈N c i /2 > E and a sharing rule f θ with θ ∈ (0, 1 3 ). We first provide partial answers to the question of existence of NEPs for these kind of games. Later, we provide an example that illustrates that we might need a different characterization for these NEPs (in case they exist).
The next lemma provides a sufficient condition for existence of an NEP. In particular, under this condition there is an NEP (y, β, m) 
Then there exists an NEP in (E, c, f θ ).
Proof. Let (y, β, m) be a claims profile such that for all t ∈ M ,
In order to prove that condition (1) of Lemma 3.1 is satisfied, we consider two cases:
Then by Lemma 4.1, it is sufficient to note that for all i ∈ P (t),
, and for all i / ∈ P (t), AG i (1, t) = 1 k+1 and AG i (2, t) = 1−θk 2 (≤ 1 k+1 , since θ ≥ k 2 −k−1 k 3 −k ). If t ∈ M is such that |P (t)| = k + 1. Then by Lemma 4.1, it is sufficient to note that for all i ∈ P (t), AG i (1, t) = (1 − θk)− 1 k+1 (≤ 1 k+1 , since θ ≥ k 2 −k−1 k 3 −k ), and for all i / ∈ P (t), AG i (1, t) = 1 k+2 and either AG i (2, t) = 1−θ(k+1) 2 (< 1 k+1 , since θ ≥ k 2 −k−1 k 3 −k and obtained if θ(k + 2) < 1) or there is no additional gain for placing a second claim (obtained if θ(k + 2) ≥ 1).
Suppose θ ≥ 1 k+1 . If t ∈ M is such that |P (t)| = k, then by Lemma 4.1, it is sufficient to note that for all i ∈ P (t),
, and for all i / ∈ P (t), AG i (1, t) = 1 k+1 and there is no additional gain for placing a second claim. If t ∈ M is such that |P (t)| = k + 1, then by Lemma 4.1, it is sufficient to note that for all i ∈ P (t), AG i (1, t) = 0, and for all i / ∈ P (t), AG i (1, t) = 1 k+2 .
Hence in both cases Lemma 3.1 implies that the claims profile is an NEP.
A consequence of Lemma 4.12 is that if θ ≥ 5 24 -which is the maximum attained by k 2 −k−1 k 3 −k , namely for k = 3 -then there always exists an NEP.
The following example shows that an NEP need not exist for claim games with θ ∈ (0, 1 6 ). Example 4.13. Consider the claim game (E, c, f θ ), with θ ∈ (0, 1 6 ), with E = 1 and c = (1, 1, 1). We show that no NEP exists.
To the contrary, suppose that (y, β, m) is an NEP. Clearly, β N (t) > 0 for all t. We prove the following three claims. of equilibrium payoffs may differ (compare the games (E, c, f CEA ) and (E, c, f P )) or may even be empty (see the game (E, c, f CEA )). The following example shows that if we consider the game (E, c, f θ ) with θ = 1 4 , we yet get a different equilibrium payoff vector.
Constrained equal awards
In this subsection we analyze the game (E, c, f CEA ), cf. Definition 2.2. The first lemma shows that the uniform claims profile is an NEP.
Lemma 5.1. The uniform claims profile (y, β, 1) is an NEP in (E, c, f CEA ).
Proof. Consider player i ∈ N , then either u CEA i (y, β, 1) = c i or u CEA i (y, β, 1) < c i . In the former case, it is impossible for i to improve. In the latter case, because of the uniform claims profile, β i (t) > λ for all t ∈ M (with λ as in Definition 2.2). This implies that player i cannot gain by deviating. So (y, β, 1) is an NEP.
The following example shows that the uniform claims profile is not necessarily the unique NEP.
Example 5.2. Consider the two-player problem (E, c) with E = 2 and c = (1 3 4 , 3 4 ). Suppose player 1 puts a claim of 3 4 on [0, 1] and a claim of 1 on [1, 2]; and player 2 puts a claim of 1 2 on [0, 1] and a claim of 1 4 on [1, 2] . This claims profile is an NEP, although it is not the uniform claims profile. Observe that λ = 1 2 on [0, 1] and λ = 3 4 on [1, 2], so that the associated payoffs are (1 1 4 , 3 4 ). These are the same payoffs the players obtain if the constrained equal awards rule is applied to (E, c).
In this example the equilibrium payoffs are equal to the payoffs assigned by the constrained equal awards rule. The following theorem shows that this is true in general.
Theorem 5.3. All NEPs result in the same payoffs, equal to the payoffs assigned by the constrained equal awards rule.
Proof. Suppose (y, β, m) is an NEP in (E, c, f CEA ). Suppose there exists a player i ∈ N and t, t ∈ M with β i (t) > λ and β i (t ) < λ. We derive a contradiction. If i decreases his claim on t to λ, he will not incur any loss. However, since β i (t ) < λ, increasing his claim on t leads to a positive gain, which contradicts the NEP assumption.
So in an NEP, we have two sets of players: let J denote the set of players with β j (t) ≥ λ for all t ∈ M , where at least one of the inequalities is strict, and let N \ J denote the set of players with β i (t) ≤ λ for all t ∈ M .
Note that for all t ∈ M , f CEA j (β(t)) = λ for all j ∈ J, and f CEA i (β(t)) = β i (t) for all i ∈ N \ J. In other words, all players i ∈ N \ J receive exactly their claim. All players j ∈ J receive the same payoff, which is at least as much as the players i ∈ N \ J, but strictly less than their claim. This is precisely the payoff each player obtains from the constrained equal awards rule applied to the estate division problem (E, c).
Talmud
In this subsection we analyze the game (E, c, f T ): see Definition 2.4 for the definition of f T = f 1 2 . We consider two cases: estate division problems with i∈N c i /2 > E and those with i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. We start with the former case. Proof. Suppose (y, β, m) is an NEP. Recall that β N (t) ≥ 1 for all t ∈ M . Let J denote the set of players with 1 2 β j (t) > λ for some t ∈ M with β N (t) ≥ 2. Since β N (t) > 2 for some t ∈ M , there exists a player j ∈ P (t) with 1 2 β j (t) > λ, which shows that J = ∅. We first prove the statement for |J| = 1 and afterwards for |J| ≥ 2.
Suppose that |J| = 1. Since j ∈ J can reduce his claim on t to λ without any loss (since the constrained equal awards rule is applied on this interval), it should not be possible for him to gain a positive amount from an increase in claim on a different interval t = t.
If β N (t ) ≥ 2, this implies that 1 2 β j (t ) ≥ λ for j ∈ J, and that 1 2 β i (t ) ≤ λ for all i ∈ N \ {j} by definition of J.
If β N (t ) < 2, this implies by similar arguments that 1 2 β j (t ) ≥ µ for j ∈ J, while for all other players i ∈ N \ {j}, we have that 1 2 β j (t ) ≤ µ, as otherwise j ∈ J could increase his claim on t with a positive gain.
Hence in equilibrium every player i ∈ N \ {j} receives half of his claim, whereas the remainder, which is at least as much as the payoff of every i ∈ N \ {j}, is for player j. These are the same payoffs the players obtain if the Talmud rule is applied to the original estate division problem.
Suppose that |J| ≥ 2. First, we will argue that β N (t) ≥ 2 for all t ∈ M . By definition of the set J, for every player j ∈ J there exists an interval t ∈ M with β N (t) ≥ 2 and 1 2 β j (t) > λ. On this interval t, j can reduce his claim to λ without any loss (again because of the constrained equal awards rule). Since we consider an NEP, this means that it must not be possible for j to gain from an increase on any other interval.
Suppose there exists a t ∈ M with β N (t ) < 2. If there is at most one player j ∈ J with 1 2 β j (t ) ≥ µ, then one of the other players in J gains a positive amount by increasing his claim on t . If there are at least two players from J with 1 2 β j (t ) ≥ µ, then then either of these players gains a positive amount by increasing his claim on t . Since we consider an NEP, these intervals can not exist in equilibrium.
Next we show that 1 2 β j (t) ≥ λ for all j ∈ J and for all t ∈ M . Suppose, contrary to what we wish to prove, that 1 2 β j (t ) < λ for some t ∈ M . Since j can reduce his claim on some t = t without any loss, he can make a positive gain by increasing his claim on t . This is a contradiction.
Hence in equilibrium, for all t ∈ M , 1 2 β j (t) ≥ λ for all j ∈ J and 1 2 β i (t) ≤ λ for all i ∈ N \ J by definition of J. This means that all players i ∈ N \ J receive half of their claim on every interval, while all players j ∈ J receive an equal amount which is at least as much as what the players in N \ J receive. Again, these payoffs are equal to the payoffs assigned by the Talmud rule to the original estate division problem.
The following lemma is convenient for finding the equilibrium payoffs in case i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. It is the analogue of Lemma 5.12.
Lemma 5.5. Let (E, c) ∈ C N 0 be a restricted problem. For every NEP in (E, c, f T ) there exists a payoff-equivalent NEP such that |P (t)| ≤ 2 and β i (t) = 1 for all t ∈ M and i ∈ P (t).
Proof. Let (y, β, m) be an NEP. We will show that we can redistribute the claims on every interval t ∈ M such that |P (t )| ≤ 2 and β i (t ) = 1 for all i ∈ P (t ), for every subinterval t of t, but without changing any player's total share of the interval t. This generates a new finer claim profile which is still an NEP.
Observe that β N (t) ≥ 1 for all t ∈ M , and that β i (t) = 1 for i ∈ P (t) if |P (t)| = 1. Thus for this lemma, we only consider intervals with two or more claimants.
Suppose there is some t ∈ M with β N (t) > 2. There can only be one player j with 1 2 β j (t) > λ (otherwise one of such players can gain by increasing his claim on t = t with β N (t ) < 2). Because j can reduce his claim to λ without any loss and since we consider an NEP, j can increase his claim on any t = t without any gain. As i∈N c i /2 ≤ E, it is thus possible to redistribute j's claims such that all t ∈ M satisfy β N (t) ≤ 2 but without changing the shares of the players.
Thus, w.l.o.g., we can assume that all t ∈ M satisfy 1 ≤ β N (t) ≤ 2. For all t ∈ M , divide P (t) into two different groups. Let J(t) denote the set of players j for who β j (t) − µ > 1 2 β j (t), then P (t) \ J(t) is the set of players i for who β i (t) − µ ≤ 1 2 β i (t). This means that the share of player j ∈ J(t) is equal to β j (t) − µ and the share of
We show that for some y t−1 < α < y t , we can reshuffle all the claims on (y t−1 , y t ) such that on every subinterval of (y t−1 , α) there is a claim of 1 by two players, on every subinterval of (α, y t ) there is a claim of 1 by one player, and all shares of players i ∈ P (t) remain unchanged. The procedure we use here is similar to the way we describe the payoffs in Corollary 3.3, using the vector r, only now applied to the specific interval t. Since β N (t) (y t − y t−1 ) = 2 (α − y t−1 ) + (y t − α), we have α = y t−1 + (β N (t) − 1) (y t − y t−1 ). Let x j = 2µ for all j ∈ J(t) and x i = β i (t) for all i ∈ P (t) \ J(t) denote the part of the claim distributed on (y t−1 , α) such that on every part there is a claim of 1 by two players, and let β j (t) − x j for all j ∈ J(t) be distributed on (α, y t ) such that on every part there is a claim of 1 by one player.
In order to see that we have a feasible redistribution, note the following properties:
and for player i ∈ P (t) \ J(t) it is 1 2
If we reshuffle every interval in the above way, we end up with an equilibrium claims profile without changing the shares of the players.
We are now able to describe the payoffs associated with every NEP. If i∈N c i /2 > E, then Theorem 5.4 applies, which means that the equilibrium payoffs are equal to the payoffs from the Talmud rule. If i∈N c i /2 ≤ E, by Lemma 5.5 all NEP payoffs can be found by only using intervals with either one or two claimants. Hence the set of payoff vectors is equal to the set in Corollary 3.3.
Constrained equal losses
In this subsection we analyze the game (E, c, f CEL ), cf. Definition 2.3. The following example shows that the uniform claims profile is not always an NEP.
Example 5.6. Consider the three-player problem (E, c) with E = 4 and c = (4, 2, 1). The payoffs in the uniform claims profile are (3, 1, 0). If player 3 puts claim 1 on [0, 1] instead, he receives payoff 1 2 . Thus, the uniform claims profile is not an NEP in (E, c, f CEL ).
The following lemma provides a necessary condition for an NEP in the game (E, c, f CEL ).
Lemma 5.7. Let (y, β, m) be an NEP. Then β N (t) − β min (t) ≤ 1 for all t ∈ M .
Proof. Let t ∈ M . The statement trivially holds in case |P (t)| = 1. For the other cases, we argue by contradiction.
Suppose that β N (t) − β min (t) > 1, which implies that |P (t)| ≥ 2. We will show that a player i ∈ P (t) with β i (t) = β min (t) can gain by deviating. Observe that in an NEP: f j (β(t)) > 0 for all j ∈ P (t). Otherwise, a player j with f j (β(t)) = 0 could put his claim on a sufficiently small subinterval of t in order to gain a positive amount. Let i divide t into two equally large intervals. We will now show that i can transfer an amount of r from his claim on the first half to the second half, such that his share on the first half equals zero but without changing anyone's total share of the interval (including his own share). The remaining claim on the first half can then be used to increase his total share of t, since the marginal loss on the first half after the transfer is zero.
Since the losses are equally distributed among all claimants, the decrease in claim on the first half, leads to a decrease in µ (with µ as in Definition 2.3) at a constant rate of 1 |P (t)| . On the second half, the increase in claim increases µ at a constant rate of 1 |P (t)| , until some claimant's share drops to zero. We will show that during this procedure all claimants' shares remain positive on the second half, which implies that the total share of every player on t stays the same. To this end, see Figure  5 .
At the point r = r * = |P (t)|(β i (t)−µ)
, we see that µ 1 (r) -i.e., the new value of µ on the first half after a transfer of r -intersects with the line β i (t) − r. This means that we are at the point at which the share of player i dropped to zero on the first half. In order to see what happens on the second half, note that
In view of the right-hand side of the expression, we will first treat the case |P (t)| = 2 separately. If |P (t)| = 2 with β i (t) = β j (t) > 1 for i, j ∈ P (t), then µ 2 (r * ) = β i (t) = β j (t) -where µ 2 (r) is, analogously, the new value of µ on the second half. This implies that the share of player j dropped to zero on the second half after the transfer, which means that i has a share of 1 on the second half and j has a share of 1 on the first half. Notice that the remaining claim of µ 1 (r * ) = β i (t) − 1 on the first half can be placed on a sufficiently small subinterval of the first half such that i gains a positive amount on this first half as well. This, however, means that i is able to gain by deviating, which is a contradiction.
On the other hand, if |P (t)| = 2 with β i (t) < β j (t) for i, j ∈ P (t) or if |P (t)| ≥ 3 then µ 2 (r * ) < β j (t) for all j ∈ P (t) \ i. This means that the share of every player j ∈ P (t) \ i remains positive on the second half after the transfer of i. This conclusion is obvious for |P (t)| = 2 with r β i (t)
Figure 5: An illustration of the level of µ on the first and second half of t. The value of r represents the amount of claim transferred from the first to the second half of t. The line µ 1 (r) denotes the level of µ on the first half of t and the line µ 2 (r) denotes the level of µ on the second half of t. The line β i (t) − r represents the amount of claim of player i left on the first half of the interval. Notice that the slope of µ 1 (r) is −1 |P (t)| until r * and the slope of µ 2 (r) is 1 |P (t)| until r * .
This is true since f j (β(t)) > 0 for all j ∈ P (t), thus in particular for player j himself. In order to show that i can actually gain by deviating, observe that since µ 1 (r * ) = β N (t)−β i (t)−1 n−1 > 0 by assumption, player i could decrease his claim by an additional positive, but sufficiently small, amount of r on the first half without any loss, while having a marginal gain of 1 − 1 |P (t)| on the second half. This contradicts that (y, β, m) is an NEP.
As a corollary to the previous lemma, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniform claims profile to be an NEP. Proof. If the uniform claims profile is an NEP, then Lemma 5.7 implies i∈N
which is the only-if statement. For the if-part, suppose that i∈N c i − min i∈N c i ≤ E and consider the uniform claims profile. The average gain of any increase on an interval is at most n−1 n , as the increased loss is equally divided among all players as long as the shares remain positive. The average loss of a decrease is at least n−1 n by similar arguments. Hence, no player has a profitable deviation.
The following theorem gives a full description of every possible NEP. We restrict our attention to those estate division problems with i∈N c i > E. The reason for this is that if i∈N c i = E then in equilibrium every interval t ∈ M satisfies β N (t) = 1, which means that everyone receives his claim.
Theorem 5.9. Let (y, β, m) be a claims profile for the restricted problem (E, c) ∈ C N with i∈N c i > E. Then the following statements are equivalent:
Then k ≥ 2 and the following three conditions are satisfied:
Proof. For the implication (i) ⇒ (ii), let (y, β, m) be an NEP in (E, c, f CEL ) and define k as in (ii).
Observe that since a player can not be the sole winner of every interval, β N (t) = 1 if |P (t)| = 1. This implies that k ≥ 2 and that we only need to consider intervals t ∈ M with |P (t)| ≥ 2. By Lemma 5.7 and since β N (t) ≥ 1 for all t ∈ M , we have that all t ∈ M with |P (t)| ≥ 2 satisfy
This proves (b). Lemma 5.7 only considers deviations within a specific interval. The following claim, which is used to prove (a) and (c), considers deviations between two different intervals. For the remainder of this proof, we denote
Proof of claim. In an NEP, player i is not able to gain by putting some of his claim of interval t on interval t. The average loss of a sufficiently small decrease in claim on t equals 1 − 1 |P (t )| . The best player i can do on t is to place a claim such that µ = β (|P (t )|) (t), meaning that at most |P (t )| − 1 other players have a positive share left. Player i cannot do better, since a further increase would lead to a marginal gain of at most 1 − 1 |P (t )| , whereas placing a lower claim would mean that the opportunity of a marginal gain of at least |P (t )| |P (t )|+1 will be ignored. More precisely, let player i put a claim of size β i (t) = |P (t )|β (|P (t )|) (t) − |P (t )|−1 j=1 β (j) (t) + 1 on a δ-fraction of t, where 0 < δ ≤ 1 is chosen such that the average loss on t does not exceed |P (t )|−1 |P (t )| . His loss in payoff from t is then equal to the total amount of claim needed times the average loss:
Since µ = β (|P (t )|) (t), the gain in payoff from t is equal to
Since the loss in payoff must be at least as large as the gain in payoff, we get after tedious rewriting:
This completes the proof of the Claim.
For (a), suppose that β N (t ) > 1 for t ∈ M with |P (t )| < k. We will derive a contradiction. Consider an interval t with |P (t)| = k. Observe that there cannot be a player i ∈ P (t ) ∩ P (t) (since then his marginal loss on t would be smaller than his marginal gain on t). So there exists a player i ∈ P (t ), i / ∈ P (t). From the claim,
Hence we have shown (a).
For (c), note that all t ∈ M with |P (t)| < k satisfy β N (t) = 1. This combined with i∈N c i > E, implies that there exists an interval t ∈ M with |P (t )| = k and i∈P (t ) β i (t ) > 1. Consider such an interval t together with an interval t ∈ M with |P (t)| = k and P (t ) = P (t). Then there is a player i such that i ∈ P (t ) and i / ∈ P (t). Combining the result of the claim with (4) implies that β N (t) − β min (t) = k−1 j=1 β (j) (t) = 1, which shows (c). For the implication (ii) ⇒ (i), suppose that the claim profile satisfies the conditions of (ii). It is sufficient to check that players have no incentive to deviate from intervals t ∈ M with |P (t)| = k (since for all other intervals the marginal loss equals 1, as β N (t) = 1). Due to Lemma 5.7 it is not profitable to deviate within the same interval, as the loss of removing ∆ is at least k−1 k ∆ (since the losses are equally divided) and the gain of placing it elsewhere is at most k−1 k ∆. By similar arguments, it follows that there is also no incentive do deviate to an interval with a smaller or equal number of claimants.
So the only interesting case arises if there is a player i ∈ P (t), i / ∈ P (t ) where t ∈ M with |P (t )| = k. As the minimum average loss on t equals k−1 k , the most profitable claim to put on t is the claim which assures that each player j ∈ P (t ) with β j (t ) = β min (t ) gets a share of zero. An additional increase in claim results in a marginal gain of at most k−1 k and is thus not profitable. A lower claim does not take the marginal gain of k k+1 into account, which means that the claim is not the most profitable one. More precisely, the claim needs to have a size of kβ min (t ), as then µ = β min (t). The total gain on t then equals (k − 1)β min (t ), whereas the total loss is at least k k−1 k β min (t ). This proves that no profitable deviation between intervals is possible.
The following corollary presents the existence condition for an NEP.
Corollary 5.10. The game (E, c, f CEL ) has an NEP if and only if i∈N c i /2 ≤ E.
Proof. Let (y, β, m) be an NEP. If |P (t)| = 1, then β N (t) = 1. If |P (t)| ≥ 2, we have by Lemma 5.7 that β N (t) − β min (t) ≤ 1 for all t ∈ M . So |P (t)|β min (t) − β min (t) ≤ β N (t) − β min (t) ≤ 1, which implies that β min (t) ≤ 1 |P (t)|−1 and thus β N (t) ≤ 1 + 1 |P (t)|−1 ≤ 2. Together this implies that i∈N c i = t∈M β N (t) ≤ 2E. Suppose i∈N c i /2 ≤ E. We construct an NEP in the following way: every player puts a claim of 0 or 1 on every interval, and the total claim on every interval is 1 or 2. If we distribute the entitlements iteratively from left to right and start again on the left for the second claims, then one can check that the claims profile satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5.9.
Remark 5.11. We can also use Lemma 5.7 to derive an upper bound on the number of claimants on an interval in an equilibrium as in Corollary 5.10. If i∈N c i = E, then β N (t) = 1 for all t ∈ M in equilibrium, and only n is an upper bound. Now let ∈ R, > 1 be such that 1 + 1 E < i∈N c i ≤ 2E. Then is an upper bound, which can be seen as follows. If |P (t)| = 1, then clearly |P (t)| < . If |P (t)| ≥ 2, we have by Lemma 5.7 that β N (t) ≤ 1 + β min (t) ≤ 1 + 1 |P (t)|−1 for all t ∈ M . This implies that
which in turn implies |P (t)| ≤ .
In order to be able to describe the equilibrium payoffs, we show that in equilibrium any interval can be redistributed such that the payoffs for the players remain unchanged and only intervals with one or two claimants are used.
Lemma 5.12. For every NEP in (E, c, f CEL ) there exists a payoff-equivalent NEP such that |P (t)| ≤ 2 and β i (t) = 1 for all t ∈ M and i ∈ P (t).
Proof. Let (y, β, m) be an NEP. We will show that we can redistribute the claims on every interval t ∈ M such that |P (t )| ≤ 2 and β i (t ) = 1 for all i ∈ P (t ), for every subinterval t of t, but without changing a player's total share of the interval t. This generates a new finer claim profile which is still an NEP.
We only need to consider intervals t ∈ M with |P (t)| ≥ 2, since β i (t) = 1 for i ∈ P (t) if |P (t)| = 1. By Lemma 5.7, every interval t with |P (t)| ≥ 2 satisfies the following inequality: 1 − β min (t) ≤ β N (t) − β min (t) ≤ 1. The share of each player i ∈ P (t) for such an interval is
We show that for some α with y t−1 < α < y t , we can reshuffle all the claims on (y t−1 , y t ) such that on each subinterval of (y t−1 , α) there is a claim of 1 by two players, on each subinterval of (α, y t ) there is a claim of 1 by one player, and all shares of players i ∈ P (t) remain unchanged. The procedure we use here is similar to the way we describe the payoffs in Corollary 3.3, using the vector r, only now applied to the specific interval t. Since β N (t) (y t − y t−1 ) = 2 (α − y t−1 ) + (y t − α), we have α = y t−1 + (β N (t) − 1) (y t − y t−1 ). Let x i = 2(β N (t)−1) |P (t)| for i ∈ P (t) denote the part of the claim of player i distributed on (y t−1 , α) such that on every part there is a claim of 1 by two players, and let β i (t) − x i be distributed on (α, y t ) such that on every part there is a claim of 1 by one player.
Restricted and
Restricted, Restricted, Unrestricted and integer claims arbitrary claims and arbitrary claims and integer claims 
Talmud-payoff Solve (E, c , f T ), (Lemma 4.11) (Lemma 5.5) (Theorem 5.4) where c i = min{c i , E}
No NEPs
No NEPs (Corollary 3.3) (Lemma 5.12) (Corollary 5.10) (Corollary 6.4) Table 1 : A summary of the equilibrium payoffs for the three main sharing rules for different problems. For clarification, we refer to the corresponding references.
Then we turn to claim games with sharing rules derived from the TAL-family. These results are summarized in Table 1 . The first (most left) column describes the possible NEP payoffs in integer claim games associated with restricted problems. The payoff from the CEL sharing rule arises from taking k = 1: NEPs exist if and only if i∈N c i ≤ 2E. For all restricted problems (E, c) ∈ C N , we have the following relation between the different sets of equilibrium payoffs:
The second column maintains the condition i∈N c i ≤ 2E, but allows for arbitrary claims. This does not essentially affect the payoffs under CEL or Talmud, but for CEA all payoffs coincide with the payoffs assigned by the CEA rule to the original estate division problem. The third column concerns arbitrary claims under the condition i∈N c i /2 > E. The fourth column collects some results for unrestricted problems.
In future research, the present analysis may be extended to still other rules, e.g., the ICI (containing the TAL-family) and CIC classes in Thomson (2008) . An interesting open question is whether a rule exists that results in an equilibrium payoff for problems with i∈N c i /2 > E.
